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JURISDICTION
This case is here on this Court's August 9, 2001 grant of Tracey Cannon's and
Cannon Associates, Inc.'s ("Appellants") Petition for Writ of Certiorari, a copy of which
is included in the Addendum as Exhibit 1. Appellants seek this Court's review of the
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the Final Order of Judgment entered on
January 11, 2000, by the Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Constitution art. VIII, sec. 5, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
When a real estate agent fraudulently induced a listing agreement, and that agent's
broker brought suit against an innocent defendant to collect a commission based on the
fraudulently obtained contract, did the Utah Court of Appeals err when it failed to follow
the rules of law affirmed in this Court's decision in Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811
P.2d 151 (Utah 1991), which require that the agent's knowledge of the fraud be imputed
to the principal for purposes of showing lack of merit and bad faith? This issue was
raised to the trial court by way of motion. (R. at 979).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
""On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial
court."" Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, 416 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah 2001) (quoting
Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 408 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (quoting Lysenko v. Sawaya,
2000 UT 58, P15, 7 P.3d 783)). "The court of appeals' decision is reviewed for
correctness, and its conclusions of law are afforded no deference." Esquivel v. Labor
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Comm'n, 2000 UT 66, 7 P.3d 777 (Utah 2000) (citing Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall
1999 UT 33, P4, 978 P.2d 460).
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND CASES
The following cases and statutory provisions are deemed controlling and are relied
upon in this brief:
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (1988)
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-10(1) (1997)
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2) (1997)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This case arises out of a fraud perpetrated by Aries Hansen ("Hansen"), an agent

of Wardley Better Homes & Garden ("Wardley"), a real estate brokerage and the plaintiff
in the underlying action. Wardley5 s agent falsified dates in certain real estate listing
agreements signed by landowners named Mascaro, fraudulently extending the
agreements' intended term from one (1) day, to a year and a day (366 days). Months
after the intended one-day listing lapsed, Tracey Cannon, ("Cannon") a real estate broker,
listed the property and eventually facilitated a sale, earning a commission. Seeking to
enforce its agent's fraudulent listing agreement, Wardley brought suit against the
Mascaros and, eventually, Cannon, seeking the commission on Cannon's sale. At the
conclusion of the litigation, Cannon had been forced to spend over $60,000 in attorneys
fees defending herself against, and ultimately proving that Wardley's claims were based

on the fraudulent conduct of its own agent (R. at 996-99). When Cannon sought her
attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 ("Utah Bad Faith Statute"), the trial
court denied the motion, ruling that "Wardley" did not act in bad faith in pursuing the
commission and other claims. This appeal ensued, and the judgment of the trial court
denying attorneys' fees was affirmed in the panel opinion below.
B.

RELEVANT FACTS:
1.

Because Utah law specifies only a broker may pursue a commission earned

by an agent, Wardley first brought suit against the Mascaros on November 7, 1994, (R. at
1), many months after the listing agreements were signed, alleging that Wardley had
found a ready, willing and able buyer for the Mascaros' property, and that pursuant to the
listing agreements signed by Hansen, Wardley was entitled to a commission from the
Mascaros. (R. at 4).
2.

After learning that the Mascaro property had been sold with Cannon's

assistance, Wardley amended its complaint on August 4, 1995 (R. at 81) to add and bring
claims against Cannon alleging unlawful interference with contract and civil conspiracy.
(R. at 87-89). Over a year later, on August 19, 1996, Wardley moved to amend its
complaint for a second time for the purpose of, among other things, adding three more
claims against Cannon. (R. at 175-76). Wardley's actions continued to mount against
Cannon in spite of the fact that Wardley's agent had actual knowledge he had
fraudulently induced the listing agreements.
3.

Cannon opposed Wardley's motion to file a second amended complaint.

(R. at 248). Although the trial court eventually allowed Wardley to file a second
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amended complaint, it expressly cautioned Wardley against bringing claims for which no
good faith basis existed:
The Motion to Amend Complaint is granted. It should be
noted that this Court is not ruling on the viability of any of
plaintiffs new claims. Plaintiff is urged to very carefully
assess the facts and law and only file those claims that can be
brought in good faith after diligent exploration of the facts.
(R. at 269). See, court's Ruling dated October 9, 1996, a true and correct copy of which
is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 2 (emphasis added).
4.

Despite the trial court's admonition, and despite its agent's actual

knowledge of the fraudulently induced listing agreements, Wardley chose to file its
Second Amended Complaint against Cannon, wherein Wardley alleged that Cannon
violated the Utah Administrative Code, converted Wardley's property, and intentionally
interfered with listing agreements executed between Wardley and the Mascaros. (R. at
278-80). Those claims were premised upon listing agreements assuming a term of 366
days which, of course, was a false premise known to Wardley's agent. Cannon answered
and claimed that Wardley should pay attorneys' fees under the Utah Bad Faith Statute.
5.

Trial began on June 8, 1998 and continued through June 11, 1998. At the

conclusion of the trial, the court ruled from the bench that Wardley had not established a
cause of action against Cannon under the Utah Administrative Code. (R. at 927).
Likewise, the court also ruled that Wardley had not met its burden of proof in connection
with its claim that Cannon interfered with Wardley's prospective economic relations. (R.
at 927). Finally, the court ruled that Wardley had not met its burden of proof as to its
claim that Cannon's failure to remit the commissions on the sale of the Mascaros'

property to Cannon constituted conversion. (R. at 927). The trial court took the
remaining issues raised in Wardley's Second Amended Complaint under advisement. (R.
at 927).
6.

On August 28, 1998, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision, a true

and correct copy of which is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 3 (R. at 937). The
trial court found that Wardley's agent changed and altered dates in the listing agreements
with the Mascaros. (R. at 943-44). The trial court also found that Wardley's agent, to
induce the Mascaros to sign the listing agreements, fraudulently represented that the
listing agreements would be limited to one-party, and would expire in one day. (R. at
944). Specifically, the trial court found that Wardley's agent "altered the November 15,
1993, date which was originally found on the first listing agreement and added expiration
dates to the remaining three listing agreements to reflect an unagreed and unintended
one-year duration." (R. at 948). The trial court found that Wardley's agent took full
advantage of his opportunity to deceive the Mascaros by hastily meeting with the
Mascaros to obtain their signatures on the listing agreements on a Sunday, when
Wardley's agent knew that the Mascaros' legal counsel would most likely not be present.
(R. at 949). The trial court concluded that the listing agreements were fraudulently
induced and, therefore, Wardley did not have any viable economic relations with the
Mascaros with which Cannon could interfere. (R. at 951). Wardley never appealed these
factual findings.
7.

On September 25, 1998, Cannon filed a motion to recover the attorney's

fees and costs she incurred in defending against Wardley's claims. (R. at 979). On
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February 9, 2000, the trial court awarded Cannon $2091.45 in costs. (R. at 1393). On
April 21, 1999, the trial court entered its order denying Cannon's motion for attorneys'
fees, ruling that "Wardley" was not responsible for the fraudulent conduct of its agent
because it did not participate in its agent's fraudulent conduct, it did not know its agent
was engaging in fraudulent conduct, and it did not have reason to know that its agent had
engaged in fraudulent conduct. (R. at 1265-66) A copy of the trial court's Ruling is
included at the Addendum as Exhibit 4.
8.

The trial court's April 21, 1999 order denying Cannon's motion for

attorney's fees was incorporated by reference into the court's Final Order of Judgment
dated January 11, 2000. (R. at 1359-60). A copy of the trial court's Final Order of
Judgment is included at the Addendum as Exhibit 5. Cannon appealed to this Court from
the Final Order of Judgment (R. at 1358-61), which appeal was poured-over to the Utah
Court of Appeals. Cannon did not marshal evidence in its briefing, because the trial
court's factual findings of fraud by Wardley's agent were unchallenged and accurate.
9.

On February 15, 2001, a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial

court's legal determinations that Wardley should be viewed separately from its fraudulent
agent, that the agent's knowledge of the fraud should not be imputed to Wardley, and
thus Wardley was not liable for attorneys' fees under Utah's Bad Faith Statute. A copy
of the Court of Appeals' opinion is included at the Addendum as Exhibit 6.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
If Wardley's fraudulent agent, Hansen, had been the plaintiff suing Cannon, his
liability for fees in seeking to enforce a contract he knowingly altered to extend its term

would be undisputed. But Utah law precluded Hansen from being the plaintiff, and
instead required his broker, Wardley, to file suit. That is because under Utah's common
law and statutory scheme, the broker is entitled to the commission and, as the principal, it
is both responsible for and benefits from its agent's activities. Because Hansen was
acting as an agent for Wardley at all relevant times, because Wardley stood to share in
the commission it was seeking by trying to enforce a fraudulent contract, and because
Utah law does not distinguish between broker and agent in relation to these real property
dealings, Hansen's knowledge of his fraud should be imputed to his principal, Wardley.
Thus, this Court should find that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erroneously
denied Cannon attorneys fees under Utah's Bad Faith Statute.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO SEE NO
MEANINGFUL DISTINCTION BETWEEN HODGES AND THIS
CASE, AND THUS HANSEN'S ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF HIS
OWN FRAUD SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPUTED TO WARDLEY.
In 1991, this Court considered the question of whether the knowledge of an

employee may be imputed to the employer when the employer pursues claims against a
person known by the employee to be innocent of the claims. This Court answered that
question in the affirmative, so long as the employee was acting within the scope of his
employment and, at least in part, to benefit his employer. In Hodges v. Gibson Products
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991), Gibson's store manager, named Cosgrove, had been
stealing money from Gibson. There came a point in time when Cosgrove cast blame on
Hodges, a part-time bookkeeper, and, on behalf of Gibson, Cosgrove went to the police
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and filed criminal charges against Hodges. Before Hodges was put on trial, the theft by
Cosgrove came to light, and the charges against Hodges were dropped. In affirming the
jury verdict against Gibson in the subsequent civil trial for malicious prosecution, this
Court imputed to Gibson as a matter of law Cosgrove's actual knowledge that Hodges
was innocent. Thus, Gibson, as the employer, was charged with knowingly pursuing
false claims against an innocent party.
In holding Gibson responsible for its agent's knowledge, this Court in Hodges
relied upon Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 comment c, and articulated the
following rule of law:
Thus, the knowledge which Gibson's servants had in
initiating the malicious prosecution action against Hodges and
the responsibility for the initiation of the action itself is
imputed, as a matter of law, to Gibson, if Gibson's servants
acted within the scope of their authority and were motivated
either in whole or in part to carry out Gibson's purposes.
Hodges, at 157.
Cannon argued to the Court of Appeals that like Gibson, Wardley was pursuing
claims against an innocent third party, which claims were known to Wardley's agent to
be false. The panel erred when it attempted to distinguish Hodges from this case by
characterizing the prosecuting party in Hodges as Cosgrove, not Gibson. "In Hodges, the
court imputed knowledge of a managerial employee, Cosgrove, to his employer and held
his employer liable for Cosgrove's intentional malicious prosecution of Hodges."
Wardley Better Homes and Garden v. Cannon et aL 2001 UT App 48,1 9, 21 P.3d 235,
239 (emphasis added). Contrary to the panel's statement, Cosgrove did not prosecute

Hodges. Gibson did. The Court of Appeals' fundamental misunderstanding of the facts
and meaning of Hodges was error, since it was Gibson with sole standing to pursue the
claims of theft against Hodges, not Cosgrove. This erroneous distinction lies at the heart
of, and thus flawed the panel's decision.
While Cosgrove may have been the live person filing criminal charges against
Hodges, he was doing so on behalf of and in the name of Gibson. The Court of Appeal's
confusion between the principal and agent in Hodges mimicked the underlying flaw in
the trial court's analysis below, by suggesting there is a legal difference between
principal and agent in these situations. There is not. Cosgrove had no personal claims
against Hodges. Hodges was not charged with stealing from Cosgrove. Here too,
Hansen had no personal claims against Cannon. Wardley's fraudulent agent lacked
standing to bring claims against Cannon.1 Only Wardley had standing to pursue the
commissions under Utah statute.
The Court of Appeals' error is repeated in its last paragraph. "There is no legal
support for [Cannon's] claim that vicarious liability should be applied in a manner that
imputes the agent's knowledge to the principal to answer for the principal's own actions."
Id. at ^[ 11. Thus, the panel's earlier confusion between agent and principal is continued
here. Cannon did not seek to have Wardley answer for its "own actions." This logic
presupposed that Wardley is a live person, with knowledge and actions independent of its
agents. Yet when the principal is a corporation, as here and in Hodges, the only means of
1

That Hansen was Wardley's agent, and that only Wardley had standing to bring the suit
against Cannon, is undisputed. Utah's statutory scheme requires that Wardley, as the
broker, pursue the claims of its agents, since it is the broker who is entitled to real estate
commissions. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2-10(1) and 61-2-18(2).
9

taking any action is through agents. Wardley, as a corporation, has no actions of its
"own." Thus, the knowledge of an agent acting in the scope of his employment, and for
the benefit of his principal should necessarily be imputed to that principal - here,
Wardley.
B.

DECADES OF UTAH JURISPRUDENCE SUPPORT APPLICATION
OF THE HODGES RULE HERE.
Utah's jurisprudence concerning imputed knowledge and vicarious liability is well

developed, and its origins precede Statehood:
It is a general doctrine of law that, although the principal is
not ordinarily liable (for he sometimes is) in a criminal suit
for the acts or misdeeds of his agent, unless, indeed, he has
authorized or co-operated in those acts or misdeeds, yet he is
held liable to third persons in a civil suit for the frauds,
deceits, concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligences,
and other malfeasances or misfeasances, and omissions of
duty of his agent in the course of his employment, although
the principal did not authorize or justify or participate in, or
indeed know of, such misconduct, or even if he forbade the
acts or disapproved of them. In all cases the rule applies,
respondeat superior, and it is founded upon public policy and
convenience; for in no other way could there be any safety to
third persons in their dealings, either directly with the
principal, or indirectly with him, through the instrumentality
of agents. In every such case the principal holds out his agent
as competent and fit to be trusted; and thereby, in effect, he
warrants his fidelity and good conduct in all matters within
the scope of his agency.
Everett v. Oregon Short Line & Utah Northern RY. Co.. 9 Utah 340, 346-47, 34 P. 289,
290 (1893) (quoting Story, Doctrine of Agency, section 452). The Court of Appeals'

i s\

decision below implicitly rejects this doctrine by exonerating Wardley from any
responsibility for its fraudulent agent's actions and knowledge.
Utah courts have consistently applied the rule of law which holds that "as between
two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer through the fraud of third, that the one
who puts it in the power of the other to practice the fraud must suffer the loss." Swartz v.
White, 80 Utah 150, 152, 13 P.2d 643, 644 (1932). As between Cannon and Wardley,
Wardley should answer for its fraudulent agent's conduct and compensate Cannon by
reimbursing her for her fees. In seeking to get a commission, Hansen was acting to
benefit Wardley as his principal. Wardley was trying hard to obtain that benefit. It was
Wardley who put Hansen in the position, and empowered him with the authority, to
deceive the Mascaros. Thus, too, Wardley put Hansen in the position to fraudulently
create the contracts upon which Wardley's claims against Cannon were based. It is
undisputed that Wardley was in a superior, and perhaps the only position to prevent the
fraud of its own agent. See G. Eugene England Found, v. Smith's Food King, 542 P.2d
753, 755 (Utah 1975); Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Utah
1974); Heavy v. The Commercial NatT Bank, 27 Utah 222, 229, 75 P. 727, 729 (1904 ).
The Court of Appeals ignored these policies in its opinion. Wardley was not a victim
here. Unless Cannon is reimbursed for the attorney's fees she paid in defending against
Wardley's claims, then Cannon alone will suffer the financial consequences of Hansen's
dishonesty. In such circumstances, this Court has uniformly concluded that the burden
should fall upon Wardley, as "the party that held [Hansen] out and gave him the character
and standing of an honest man." Sullivan v. Evans-Morris Whitney Co., 54 Utah 293,

n

304, 180 P. 435, 439 (1919). This policy should be reaffirmed again here, and this Court
should reverse the Court of Appeals' decision below.
C.

BECAUSE WARDLEY IS AND SHOULD BE IMPUTED WITH THE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OF ITS
AGENT, CANNON IS ENTITLED TO BE COMPENSATED FOR
THE ATTORNEY'S FEES SHE EXPENDED IN DEFENDING
AGAINST WARDLEY'S MERITLESS CLAIMS, BROUGHT IN
BAD FAITH.
Section 78-27-56(1) of the Utah Code requires the court to award reasonable

attorney's fees to a prevailing party if an action is without merit and brought in bad faith.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1) (1988); Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Sons, 808
P.2d 1061, 1067 (Utah 1991). Because Wardley is imputed with knowledge of the
fraudulent nature of its claims against Cannon, this Court should remand this case back to
the trial court with instructions to determine a reasonable attorneys fee below, and on
appeal.
1.

Wardley's Claims Were Without Merit

A claim is without merit if it is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance
having no basis in law or fact." Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). In
accusing Cannon of converting its property, of violating the ethical standards which
govern real estate agents, and of interfering with contracts that Wardley's agent
unlawfully and fraudulently obtained, Wardley asserted defamatory and frivolous claims
which had no basis in fact or law. Wardley, imputed with the knowledge of its agent,

knew the contracts at issue were fraudulently obtained. Thus, each of Wardley's claims
was meritless as a matter of law.
2.

Wardley's Claims Were Brought in Bad Faith

The Second Amended Complaint was brought in bad faith. A claim is asserted in
bad faith if, among other things, it is asserted "to take unconscionable advantage of
others." Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. Wardley's case against Cannon was not about collecting
a debt based on a lawful and binding contract, or even upon a colorable claim of such.
Rather, this case involved a real estate brokerage that, through its authorized agent,
altered the material terms of several contracts with Mascaros, and then elected to expand
the scope of its attack to Cannon, a stranger to the dealings between Mascaros and
Wardley. This Court should not countenance Wardley's improper attempt to take
advantage of Cannon in this lawsuit. Instead, this Court should require that Wardley pay
Cannon the attorneys' fees and costs she has incurred in defending against this action.
Wardley correctly asserted below that, as a general rule, fraud committed by a
third party cannot be imputed to another defendant. However, in Jensen v. IHC Hosps.,
Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 338 (Utah 1997), this Court expressly held that "[w]here . . . there is
an agency or privity relationship between the third party committing the fraud and the
defendant, our cases indicate that liability for the agent's negligent or intentional tort can
be imputed to the principal if the agent acts in whole or in part to carry out the purposes
of the principal. Id. (citing Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah
2

Attorney's fees are particularly warranted here when, prior to trial, the court expressly
cautioned Wardley about proceeding with claims against Cannon which, after a diligent
exploration of the facts, would prove untenable. See Court's Ruling dated October 9,
1996. (R. at 269.)
1?

1991); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989)). This factual
standard is met here.
It is not disputed that Wardley's agent acted in bad faith by fraudulently altering
listing agreements. Moreover, Wardley does not dispute that its agent (1) lacked an
honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) intended to take
unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) intended to or acted with the knowledge that
the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald,
961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998; see Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983).
Instead, Wardley contends that it should not be required to pay Cannon's attorney's fees
because "it" was unaware of its own agent's duplicity. This Court should reject such an
attempt by a principal to insulate itself from the bad acts of its agent, particularly when
Wardley stood to, and vigorously fought to profit by those bad acts if they were not found
out and proven at trial. Wardley was imbued with Hansen's knowledge, and thus its
actions are tainted by that knowledge.
This Court should not permit Wardley to claim Hansen was its agent for purposes
of suing on an unpaid commission, and for purposes of collecting that commission and
other statutory damages if it succeeded in completing its agent's fraud, but suddenly was
not Wardley's agent when Wardley's commission claim was ultimately found to be based
on its own agent's fraud. Yet this is the effect of the Court of Appeals' ruling. If such a
rule were to stand, it would allow all brokerages to reap the benefits of their agents'
fraudulent and illegal conduct, without any risk or liability for those acts. Such a rule
would change the landscape of Utah's law of agency.

Accordingly, because of the agency relationship between Hansen and Wardley,
Utah law dictates that by reason of Hansen's knowledge in Wardley's bringing frivolous
claims against Cannon, those claims were necessarily brought in bad faith as a matter of
law. Wardley's liability, in this case, includes payment of Cannon's attorneys' fees and
costs incurred in defending against the meritless action Wardley brought in bad faith, and
incurred on appeal.
D.

BECAUSE THERE WERE NO FACTUAL DISPUTES, IT WAS
UNNECESSARY FOR CANNON TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE.
The panel of the Court of Appeals erroneously determined that Cannon failed to

marshal the evidence and challenge the factual findings supporting the trial court's
decision. Such failure, reasoned the panel, "is fatal to this appeal." Wardley Better
Homes and Garden v. Cannon et aL 2001 UT App 48, ^ 7, 21 P.3d 235, 239. This was
error.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the trial court made a
factual finding that "Wardley's suit was not pursued in bad faith." The fraudulent
conduct of Wardley's agent, as determined by the trial court, and the knowledge that
arose from that conduct constitute factual findings from which no one appealed. Whether
the now undisputed fraudulent conduct and knowledge of its agent should be imputed to
Wardley presents a legal question. Cannon need not marshal evidence on factual findings
not in dispute. State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App. 106, 999 P.2d 1252 (holding that
marshaling the evidence "is unnecessary because [defendant] is challenging the trial
court's legal conclusions rather than its factual findings."). Further, Cannon's decision

not to marshal the evidence supporting the uncontested facts of this case does not relieve
this Court of its obligation to '"review . . . the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions
of law and the application of that law in the case.'" Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942
P.2d 307, 312 (Utah 1997) (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991))
Here, Cannon asks this Court to review conclusions of law and the application of law to
the uncontested facts and circumstances of this case.
It is undisputed that the trial court found that Wardley's agent, Hansen,
fraudulently altered the dates of certain listing agreements and fraudulently induced his
clients, the Mascaros, to enter into the listing agreements. It is also undisputed that
Hansen was acting as Wardley's agent when he engaged in this fraudulent conduct. And,
it is undisputed that in an effort to profit from its agent's conduct, Wardley sued Cannon,
a stranger to the dealings between Wardley and the Mascaros, to collect a real estate
commission and obtain treble damages. Accordingly, the only issue before this Court is a
question of law, i.e., whether Wardley should be deemed to have the same knowledge as
its agent. Principles of agency and accountability, in particular where fiduciaries are
concerned, should move this Court to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
instruct the trial court to impose fees against Wardley under the Bad Faith Statute.
E.

THE POLICIES BEHIND THE BAD FAITH STATUTE ARE
REMUNERATIVE.
The policies behind the Bad Faith Statute support reversing the Court of Appeals.

The purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 is primarily remunerative, as it is designed to
compensate an innocent party for the costs associated with defending meritless claims
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brought in bad faith. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 was promulgated as House Bill 100
and discussed on February 5, 1991 by the House of Representatives at the 44th Utah
Legislative General Session. The sponsor of the Bill, Representative Richard L.
Maxfield, stated that:
The purpose of this bill is to eliminate vexatious and nuisance
lawsuits. . . . If [a lawsuit is filed], there is no provision even
though the suit is later dismissed because it is frivolous,
without foundation or without merit, there is no basis to
require that person who brought the suit without foundation to
pay the cost, the attorney's fees that the party had to pay to
defend it. That many times people come in, a suit has been
brought against them without foundation or basis and they
say, well there's no basis for this. I agree, but you still have
to file an answer, you have to answer and maybe even file a
motion to dismiss . . . . But you still will have to get an
attorney to file that action or unless you can do it yourself.
Most of them cannot, they have to hire an attorney. Can I
counterclaim for my attorney's fees? The answer is "No."
When it is an action such as this, you are just out your own
attorney's fees. If you can get the action dismissed, that's the
best you can do.
Statement of Rep. Maxfield, Third Reading of H.B. 100, 44th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb.
5, 1981) (H.R. Recording Tape No. 6, side 1). Thus, the primary purpose of awarding
attorneys1 fees where the losing party has filed a meritless claim in bad faith is to make
the innocent party whole by compensating the prevailing party for the legal expenses
incurred in defending against a groundless suit. If the Court of Appeals' decision is
allowed to stand, the purpose of the Bad Faith Statute will be frustrated here, and perhaps
in many future cases.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse the Court of Appeals'
opinion affirming the trial court's denial of Cannon's Motion for Attorney's Fees and
Costs, and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to determine Cannon's
reasonable attorneys' fees below, and attorney's fees incurred in appealing the trial and
appellate court's rulings, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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